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ABSTRACT
The Alternative Investment Market ("AIM') of the London Stock
Exchange is a twenty-year experiment in light securities regulation for
small companies. The empirical literature shows that the AIM
underperforms premier exchanges; however, this literature should not be
taken as evidence that the AIM experiment is a failure, rather that the AIM
serves a unique niche. In contrast to companies listing on premier
exchange, those listing on the AIM do not undergo significant changes in
ownership, control, and leverage after an initial public offering ("IPO').
Instead, these changes occur over time, if the company grows. This Article
argues, based on the empirical literature, that the AIM fills a niche for
companies and investors that fits between a premier exchange listing, which
is difficult to attain, and remaining completely private, even aided by an
issuer sponsored secondary market. From this middle ground, companies
may successfully use the AIM as an on-ramp to a listing on the Main Market
of the London Stock Exchange; however, less than one percent of companies
are able to make this transition. Even if companies do not have the Main
Market in their sights, the AIM serves as a structured liquidity market for
existing investors. The Appendices to this Article present a detailed
overview of the empirical findings from each of the reviewed studies.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Alternative Investment Market ("AIM") of the London Stock
Exchange is an experiment in light securities regulation for small and
emerging enterprises. While the AIM appears in securities literature, only a
few studies report empirical analysis of the market. With so few studies
completed, there is no consensus on the success, or failure, of the market
and the light regulation model it represents. This Article adds to the
literature by digging deep into each empirical study and distilling the
statistical landscape. Further, this Article argues that while the AIM
significantly underperforms premier exchanges with heavier regulation, it
bridges the gap between a premier exchange listing and remaining
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completely private. From this middle ground, the AIM plays two roles:
First, companies can use the AIM as an on-ramp to the Main Market of the
London Stock Exchange by growing into the heavy burden of regulation
over time. Second, companies can use the AIM to provide a structured
liquidity market for existing shareholders, even without a Main Market
listing in sight.
The last decade has seen a significant reduction in the number of
IPOs in the United States.' Some scholars have highlighted the problem and
are calling for change.' For those scholars looking for a solution, the AIM
is an exciting development for the return of IPOs-small IPOs in
particular. Not everyone agrees. In 2007, Roel Campos, an SEC
commissioner at the time, picked a fight with the London Stock Exchange
by describing the AIM "as a casino on which 30 per cent of listings were
'gone within a year."' 4 The London Stock Exchange contended that Mr.
Campos's characterization was "entirely wrong" and was motivated by
"jealousy over A[IM]'s success in attracting U.S. listings."5
In the U.S., private companies finance growth on their way to an
IPO on a premier exchange either through debt or through the private sale
of equity.6 Once equity is sold, however, investors have few options to
trade their shares in a secondary market. A private company may sponsor a
private market for their shares using a service such as SharesPost or
SecondMarket, but these are not public exchanges and do not provide the
same protections and benefits to individual shareholders.7  The
traditionalists in the U.S. securities market are satisfied with keeping small-
company financing strictly private, but regulators should consider the AIM
' Jeff Schwartz, The Twilight of Equity Liquidity, 34 CARDozO L. REv. 531, 544
(2012). However, recently higher numbers of IPOs may indicate somewhat of a
rebound. Olivia Oran et al., Global IPOs Rise on Stock Market Rebound, Private
Equity Exits, REUTERS (Mar. 28, 2013, 12:59 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/28/us-ipo-roundup- 1 stquarter-
idUSBRE92ROOL20130328.
2 Schwartz, supra note 1, at 533-36.
3 See id. at 547; Jose Miguel Mendoza, Securities Regulation in Low-tier Listing
Venues: The Rise of the Alternative Investment Market, 13 FORDHAM J. CoRP. &
FiN. L. 257, 261-63 (2008), available at
http://law.fordham.edu/assets/JCFL/MendozaJCI3_FJCFLVol.XIII.2.pdf.
I Norma Cohen et al., Top SEC Official Calls AlMa 'Casino', FIN. TIMES (Mar. 9,
2007, 2 AM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/O/fa3488b8-cde4-1 ldb-839d-
OOOb5df10621 .html#axzz3IO8LXwdO.
5Id.
6 Schwartz, supra note 1, at 550-51.
I See About SharesPost, SHARESPOST, http://sharespost.com/about-us/about-
sharespost/; Secondary Transactions, SECONDMARKET,
https://www.secondmarket.com/secondary.
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as an example of the benefits of lighter regulation in a public, structured
exchange.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II develops a background by
introducing the AIM and some of its distinguishing features. Part III
introduces the empirical literature and this Article's research approach. Part
IV reviews the empirical data showing the underperformance of the AIM as
compared to premier exchanges. Part V argues that the AIM bridges the gap
between premier exchanges and remaining a private company. Part VI
concludes and identifies areas for further study and analysis. Appendix I
contains a bibliography of the relevant empirical literature. Appendix 2
contains an extensive chart detailing the empirical findings from all of the
reviewed empirical literature.
H. THE ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT MARKET
The London Stock Exchange founded the AIM in 1995.8 Springing
from the deregulation of the Thatcher years, the AIM was an experiment in
light securities regulation.9 Almost twenty years later, the AIM has survived
through the dot com bubble of 2000 and the global economic downturn of
2008.10
The distinguishing feature of the AIM is its model of regulation.
Unlike the premier exchanges such as the NASDAQ, the New York Stock
Exchange, and the Main Market of the London Stock Exchange, which are
actively regulated by government authorities, nominated advisors
("nomads") administer the exchange's principles-based regulations.11 The
exchange, not the government regulator, promulgates a number of
principles for companies to follow and nomads act as an inside regulator
doing the due diligence necessary to ensure that a company is suitable for
initial and continued listing on the AIM.12 The exchange seeks to strike a
balance between the interests of investors and the regulatory burden on the
small companies that make up the AIM.13 For example, companies are not
required to comply with corporate governance and internal control
standards that burden similar companies in the U.S. under Sarbanes-
8 Marcus Stuttard, Foreword to A GUIDE TO AIM 3, 3 (Nigel Page ed., 2010).
9 See id.; Margaret Thatcher: No Ordinary Politician, ECONOMIST, April 13, 2013,
at 26, available at http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21576081-margaret-
thatcher-britains-prime-minister- 1979-1990-died-april-8th-age (describing the
trend of deregulation overseen by Margaret Thatcher in the 1980s).
10 See London Stock Exchange, AIM-The Most Successful Growth Market, in A
GUIDE TO AIM 4, 4 (Nigel Page ed., 2010) [hereinafter LSE, Growth Market].
" Id. at 5-6; London Stock Exchange, AIM Advisers, in A Guide to AIM 10, 10
(Nigel Page ed., 2010) [hereinafter LSE, AIMAdvisers].
12 LSE, AIMAdvisers, supra note 11.
11 See LSE, Growth Market, supra note 10, at 5-6.
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Oxley. 4 This lighter regulation and lower listing costs are a primary selling
point for the AIM. 15 For companies going and staying public on the AIM
the cost is significantly less than on the NASDAQ. 6 Over sixteen hundred
companies have raised over $45 billion in capital through IPOs on the
AIM. 1
7
In terms of the number of new listings from 2000 to 2008, the AIM
outperformed the NASDAQ, Main Market, and the OTC Bulletin Board,
which was once a competitor operated by the Financial Industry Regulatory
Authority ("FINRA"), now all but shuttered.'8 For example, in 2005 there
were 311 new listings on the AIM to only 21 on the Main Market, 132 on
the NASDAQ, and 75 on the OTC Bulletin Boards.1 9 However, the total
capital raised on the AIM was much smaller than the Main Market and the
NASDAQ until 2004 and 2005, after which the AIM exceeded both premier
markets in at least one year.20 In 2005, companies raised over $9.3 billion
on the AIM as compared to only $8.7 billion on the Main Market.2 ' The
next year, companies raised $14.2 billion on the AIM as compared to $12.8
billion on the NASDAQ.22 A comparable amount of total capital raised
spread across more listings means that AIM listings are generally smaller
than those on premier exchanges, but the volume makes up for the smaller
size.
III. THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE
The empirical literature provides a systematic analysis of the AIM.
However, each author brings differing perspective and goals to his or her
research; they set out to answer different questions using different
14 See Mendoza, supra note 3, at 269-72 & 296-97.
11 See LSE, Growth Market, supra note 10, at 5-6; FAEGRE & BENSON LLP &
BAKER TILLEY, TAKING AIm: ANNUAL SURVEY 2010 29 (2010).
16 Mendoza, supra note 3, at 308-09.
17 LSE, Growth Market, supra note 10; Joseph Gerakos et al., Post-listing
Performance and Private Sector Regulation: The Experience of London 's
Alternative Investment Market, 56 J. ACCT. & EcON. 189, 195 tbl.1 (2013)
[hereinafter Gerakos et al., Post-listing Performance].
18 Gerakos et al., Post-listing Performance, supra note 17; About OTCQB,
DEWMAR INT'L, http://www.dewmarintemational.com/about-otcqb/ (last visited
Nov. 7, 2014) ("The OTCQB marketplace has effectively replaced the FINRA
operated OTC Bulletin Board (OTCBB) as the primary market for SEC and bank
reporting securities that trade off the exchanges."); Overview and History of the
OTCBB, OTC BULLETIN BOARD,
https://www.otcbb.com/aboutOTCBB/overview.stm (last visited Nov. 7, 2014).
19 Gerakos et al., Post-listing Performance, supra note 17.2 0 Id.
21 Id.
2 2 Id.
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methodologies and data sources. While any one study can be helpful to
answer a few narrowly drawn questions, a single study cannot fully
evaluate the AIM. Evaluated as a whole, these studies provide a more
complete picture of how the AIM performs well and where it fails.
The interaction between studies is important to evaluate the weight
of any empirical finding. In some cases, studies buttress one another,
finding the same results through different methodology. In other cases,
studies undermine one another. This Part first introduces the empirical
literature reviewed by this Article. Second, this Part discusses the synthesis
process used to evaluate the literature in gross and to create the summary
chart contained in Appendix 2.
A. Summary of Reviewed Papers
There are only a few studies that complete empirical analysis on the
AIM. These studies conduct a variety of statistical analyses, including
comparing the AIM to private companies, comparing the AIM to premier
exchanges, identifying indicators of success on the AIM, and charting
disclosure trends as AIM companies grow. The following is a brief
introduction to each of the eleven empirical studies reviewed in this
Article.23
In section four of The LSE's AIM Market: Effect of Returns and
Trading of Canadian Stocks, John Board and Stephen Wells evaluate the
stock performance of companies that switch between the AIM and the Main
Market in an effort to compare stock performance on the two markets. 4
The study excludes small companies that switched multiple times and those
that switched while making fundamental changes to the nature of the
company.2 5
In Entrepreneurial Dimensions of the Growth of Small Companies,
Alessandra Colombelli evaluates six years of pre- and post-IPO
performance of 665 companies that went public on the AIM between 1995
and 2006 and correlates performance with firm characteristics at the time of
the IPO.2 6 The focus of this study is on operating performance of companies
as described in financial statements.27 This measure, as opposed to stock-
23 The studies are alphabetized by the first author's last name. See infra Appendix 1
for a bibliographic chart of these studies.
24 John Board & Stephen Wells, The LSE's AIM Market: Effect on Returns and
Trading of Canadian Stocks, in 5 CANADA STEPS UP 173, 212-13 (Task Force to
Modernize Sec. Legislation in Can. ed., 2006).5 Id. at 214.
26 Alessandra Colombelli, Entrepreneurial Dimensions of the Growth of Small
Companies 10, 12-13 (UniversitA Degli Studi Di Torino, Dipartimento di
Economia e Statistica "Cognetti de Martiis", Working Paper No. 2/2009, 2009).
27 Id.
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based performance, tracks how AIM companies perform regardless of their
reputation in the market.
In Is AIM a Casino? A Study of the Survival of New Listings on the
UK Alternative Investment Market (AIM), Susanne Espenlaub, Arif
Khurshed, and Abdul Mohamed evaluate the short-term failure of 641
companies with an IPO on the AIM between 2000 and 2004 and correlate
the long-term survival rate of 316 companies with company characteristics.
28 This study is a direct response to SEC Commissioner Roel Campos's
characterization of the AIM as a casino.29
In Post-Listing Performance and Private Sector Regulation: The
Experience of London's Alternative Investment Market, Joseph Gerakos,
Mark Lang, and Mark Maffett compare the stock performance of
companies that listed on the AIM between 1995 and 2008 with those that
listed on the Main Market of the London Stock Exchange, the NASDAQ, or
the OTC Bulletin Board, when it was regulated by the SEC.3" Out of their
original pool of 1,601 AIM companies and 2,406 premier exchange
companies, the authors were able to match 1,241 AIM companies with a
benchmark counterpart on one of the premier exchanges. 3' The authors
required that matched firms have a market value of listing within $25
million and a listing date within one year.32 This study compares the
exchanges using several performance measures and identifies several AIM
firm and nomad characteristics that are associated with better or worse
performance.33 This study is comprehensive and provides an expansive
comparison of the AIM with other exchanges. Finally, this study appears to
be the published version of an earlier working paper by the same authors
titled Listing Choices and Self-Regulation: The Experience of the AIM. 34
In Directors' Dealing and Post-IPO Performance, Hafiz Hoque
and Meziane Lasfer combine director trading information with IPO and
28 Susanne Espenlaub et al., Is AIM a Casino? A Study of the Survival of New
Listings on the UK Alternative Investment Market (AIM) 13-14 (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with the Manchester Business School Manchester Accounting
& Finance Group).
29 See id. at 4.
30 See Gerakos et al., Post-listing Performance, supra note 17, at 189 & 194.
31 Id. at 195.
32 Id.
33 See id. at 189-92.
34 See Joseph Gerakos et al., Listing Choices and Self-Regulation: The Experience
of the AIM 6, 8 & 14-15 (The Univ. of Chi. Booth Sch. of Bus., Working Paper
No. 11-04, 2011), [hereinafter Gerakos et al., Listing Choices] available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=1739137. This Article excludes references to the earlier
working paper where the results are identical to what is found in the later version
published in the Journal ofAccounting and Economics. However, there are some
instances where the working paper includes additional helpful information.
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company performance data for companies listed on one of the London
Stock Exchange markets between 1999 and 2006.3" The authors categorize
the companies based on their net purchase ratio-purchases less sells all
over total trades-and find 190 (35%) IPOs with net selling by directors
and 353 (65%) with net buying.36 Finally, the authors analyze the
association between directors' trading activity and company performance.317
In The Operating and SharePrice Performance of Initial Public
Offerings: The UK Experience, Arif Khurshed, Stefano Paleari, and Silvio
Vismara compare four years of post-IPO performance for 195 companies
that listed on the AIM with 216 companies that listed on the Main Market
from 1995 through 1999.38 The study excludes 210 IPOs of investment
trusts and other financial companies to narrow the sample to those IPOs
representing traditional businesses.39 The study focuses on the operating
performance as well as the change in ownership structure and leverage. a
In Corporate Governance in Alternative Investment Market (AIM)
Companies, Chris Mallin and Kean Ow-Yong evaluate the voluntary
corporate-governance standard compliance disclosures of 300 AIM
companies listed on the AIM before June 2006.41 The authors score each
company based on disclosure of compliance with twenty-three best
practices from the Quoted Companies Alliance ("QCA") Guidelines on
Corporate Governance for AIM Companies, which is based on the UK's
Combined Code.42 The authors also conduct extensive interviews with AIM
companies, investors, nomads, and brokers.43 Chis Mallin also presented a
paper in 2009, which was written with Kean Ow-Yong, covering similar
findings; the paper is titled Corporate Governance in Alternative
Investment Market (AIM) Companies: Determinants of Corporate
Governance Disclosure.
44
31 Haft Hoque & Meziane Lasfer, Directors Dealing and Post-IPO Performance,
EUR. J. FIN. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 5-6).
36 Id. at 6.
37 See generally id.
38 Arif Khurshed et al., The Operating and SharePrice Performance of Initial Public
Offerings: The UK Experience 9 (unpublished manuscript)(on file with author).
39 Id. at 9-10.
40 See id. at 20-21.
41 CHRIS MALLIN & KEAN Ow-YONG, INST. OF CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS OF
SCOT., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT MARKET (AIM)
COMPANIES 69-71 (2008).42 1d. atI.
13 See id. at 16-21.
I Chris Mallin & Kean Ow-Yong, Corporate Governance in Alternative
Investment Market (AIM) Companies: Determinants of Corporate Governance
Disclosure 1 (Jan. 12, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1326627. This Article excludes references to the later
presented paper where the results are identical to what is found in an earlier work
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In Factors Influencing Corporate Governance Disclosures:
Evidence from Alternative Investment Market (AIM) Companies in the UK,
Chris Mallin and Kean Ow-Yong evaluate the disclosure of corporate-
governance compliance in 300 AIM corporate annual reports released for
financial years ending in 2005 and 2006, and correlate disclosure with
company characteristics including percent of institutional ownership,
percent of managerial ownership, board size, board independence, nomads
that are also brokers, companies formerly listed on the Main Market,
companies that are shells without revenue turnover, company size, and
gearing.45 The authors select the sample companies from each industry
based on each industry's proportion of the overall AIM population.4 6
In Social Reporting by Companies Listed on the Alternative
Investment Market, Sepideh Parsa and Reza Kouhy examine eighteen
categories of social information disclosed by one hundred companies listed
on the AIM from 2001 through 2003 and correlate disclosure with company
age, industry, size, and financial gearing. 4" Social information includes
corporate culture and ethics, environmental issues, equal opportunity,
rewards, and charity.48 Although companies are not required to report most
social information, companies choose to disclose this information to
increase their reputation among outside stakeholders, such as current or
potential investors.49 This study scores disclosure through corporate annual
reports using eighteen unweighted categories of social information derived
from eight categories promulgated by the European Commission."
In Does the Alternative Investment Market Nurture Firm Growth?
A Comparison Between Listed and Private Companies, Valkrie Revest and
Alessandro Sapio compare the productivity of companies listed on the AIM
between 1997 and 2008 with their private counterparts.5 1 The authors match
limited liability manufacturing firms incorporated in the UK with private
published by The Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland or a later work
published by The European Journal of Finance. However, there are some instances
where the presentation includes additional helpful information.
" Chris Mallin & Kean Ow-Yong, Factors Influencing Corporate Governance
Disclosures: Evidence from Alternative Investment Market (AIM) Companies in the
UK, 18 EUR. J. FIN. 515, 516-22, 525 tbls.3 & 4 & 526 tbl.5 (2012).
46 Id. at 522.
41 Sepideh Parsa & Reza Kouhy, Social Reporting by Companies Listed on the
Alternative Investment Market, 79 J. Bus. ETHICS 345, 345 & 348-50 (2008).
48 Id. at 350 tbl.I.
49 Id. at 349.
50 Id. at 350.
51 Valdrie Revest & Alessandro Sapio, Does the Alternative Investment Market
Nurture Firm Growth? A Comparison Between Listed and Private Companies, 22
INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 953, 954-55 (2013), available at
http://icc.oxfordjournals.org/content/22/4/953. full.pdf+html.
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companies, based on age, size, and industry sector.12 Using employee
productivity, operating revenue, and total assets, the authors compare the
growth of the matched companies 3.5 This is a particularly interesting study
because it uses an appropriate benchmark of private companies to evaluate
AIM performance instead of firms listed on a premier exchange.
In Europe's Second Markets for Small Companies, Silvio Vismara,
Stefano Paleari, and Jay R. Ritter evaluate the performance of the AIM, and
similar second-tier markets throughout Europe, with Europe's premier
exchanges. 54 The authors use a group of 3,755 IPOs on four of Europe's
exchanges, including both first- and second-tier markets; 2,085 of those
were on the London Stock Exchange, with 1,642 on the AIM. 5 Notably,
this group excludes simple stock introductions-listing a stock without
offering any new or existing shares for sale-which are common on the
AIM and other secondary markets in Europe. 6 This exclusion is likely to
remove companies that list on the AIM for the simple purpose of providing
a structured liquidity market to existing shareholders without raising funds.
B. Process ofAnalysis
Instead of simply presenting observations based on the empirical
literature, this Article documents the intermediate research step of charting
the underlying statistical correlations. This approach provides other
researchers the opportunity to more quickly review the underlying
empirical research as whole without reviewing each underlying study. This
is a significant contribution to the literature, which to date does not include
such a detailed summary of the empirical literature studying the AIM.
Additionally, the charting methodology is unique; this approach distills
empirical correlations into an accessible representation for researchers-
showing only the relationship direction and statistical significance between
independent and dependent variables. While the magnitude of a relationship
is certainly important, the relationship direction and statistical significance
quickly convey empirical trends.
In developing this chart, the author first used simple research
techniques to cull through the available scholarly literature to identify
articles discussing the AIM. Next, the author reviewed each candidate
article closely to determine if the article conducted meaningful statistical
analysis, or was simply a recitation of anecdotal evidence, opinion, or other
literature. In determining whether a candidate article conducted meaningful
52 Id. at 960-61.
53 Id. at 961.
51 Silvio Vismara et al., Europe's Second Markets for Small Companies, 18 EUR.
FIN. MGMT. 352, 353-54 (2012).
55 Id. at 358-59 tbl.2.
56 Id.
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statistical analysis, the author looked primarily for regression analysis
correlating independent variables with dependent variables. Further, some
articles conducted meaningful statistical analysis on several markets,
including the AIM. In these cases, the author determined whether he could
separate the AIM specific analysis from that of other studied market and
included only the analysis relevant specifically to the AIM. Moreover, some
articles reported statistical analyses in a format that could not be reliably
interpreted for inclusion in the chart and were therefore excluded. 7
Finally, the author distilled each independent to dependent variable
correlation into a simple direction and statistical significance scale, called
the rated relationship. If the dependent variable moves in the same direction
as the independent variable, that relationship is represented with a plus sign
(+). For example, if an increase in the independent variable is correlated
with an increase in the dependent variable, this is reported as a positive
relationship. Conversely, if the dependent variable moves in the opposite
direction as the independent variable, the relationship is reported with a
negative sign (-). For example, if an increase in the independent variable is
correlated a decrease in the dependent variable, this relationship is reported
as negative. In most articles, relationship direction was determined by the
sign of the correlation coefficient.
Additionally, each reported relationship is rated for its statistical
significance. A relationship with no statistical significance is enclosed in
square brackets, for example [+] or [-]. A relationship with a low, but
measurable, statistical significance is reported as a single sign: + or -. In
most cases, this represents a p-value of less than or equal to 0.1, but greater
than 0.05, and may have been reported with a single asterisk (*) next to the
correlation coefficient. A moderate degree of statistical significance is
reported as two signs: + + or - -. The standard p-value for this relationship
is less than or equal to 0.05, but greater than 0.01, or two asterisks (**).
Finally, the strongest statistical significance is reported as three signs, + + +
or -- -; these relationships have a p-value of less than or equal to 0.01,
commonly represented as three asterisks (***).
While some correlative relationships are easily converted to the
rated relationship scale, others require summarization. Summarization is
necessary in some cases because too much detail in one area could quickly
overshadow an equally important, albeit more generalized, relationship in
another. For example, one study reported correlations between book
performance ratios, including return on assets and return on equity, with
year zero, one, two, and three after IPO, which results in four correlations
for each book performance ratio, and twenty-eight total correlations, most
57 For example, the empirical findings discussed in the text infra accompanying
notes 165-167 were not included in the chart because of the irregular presentation
in the original publication.
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of which indicate the same general relationship. 8 In this case, and cases
similar to it, the chart presents summarized findings.59 In this example,
return on assets has a positive, but not statistically significant, correlation
with years one through three after IPO and has a statistically significant
correlation for year zero; these four correlations are combined into one
chart entry of +.60 The chart only groups correlations when they are
generally similar and evidence the same relationship.
Crucially, the chart reports qualitative, but not quantitative,
information about each relationship. While some of the reviewed analyses
elaborate on the quantitative nature of a relationship, most analyses report
only the coefficient. Without more, the value of the coefficient alone does
not necessarily reflect in real terms to what degree a given change in the
independent variable correlates with change in the dependent variable. It is
important to keep this limitation in mind. For example, Vismara et al.
reports that an AIM listing is correlated strongly with negative three- and
five-year buy-and-hold returns as compared to the FTSE Euromid Index.61
While the chart represents this simply as strongly negative (- - -), in real
terms the AIM buy-and-hold return, in relation to the benchmark index, is
negative 27.5% at three years and negative 45.7% at five as compared to
25.3% at three years on the Main Market.62 While the chart accurately
represents that the AIM has a strong association with negative buy-and-hold
returns, it does not represent the magnitude of that negative association. In
this particular case, strong association with very large negative returns is
concerning. Therefore, compiling quantitative information about each
relationship is an important research goal, which this Article addresses in
some cases, but leaves much for another day.
Finally, the chart categorizes each dependent and independent
variable. For example, the Book Performance category of dependent
variables includes measures such as leverage, return on equity, asset
turnover, and similar financial statement measures. As an additional
example, the AIM vs. Non-AIM independent variable category includes
variables indicating a selection of the AIM instead of, for example, the
Main Market of the London Stock Exchange, the NASDAQ, the OTC Pink
Sheets, or simply remaining a private company. Explanation of a few
example entries is helpful.
58 Khurshed et al., supra note 38, at 28 tbl.5.
59 See infra notes 350-358 and accompanying text.
60 Compare Khurshed et al., supra note 38, at 28 tbl.5 (correlating return on assets
on AIM to years +1 to +3 relative to the IPO), with infra note 354 and
accompanying text.
61 Compare Vismara et al., supra note 54, at 368-69 tbl.5, with infra text
accompanying notes 200-201.
62 Compare Vismara et al., supra note 54, at 353 &368-69 tbl.5, with infra text
accompanying notes 200-201.
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Example 1. Association between AIM vs. Non-AIM, and Book
Performance
AIM listing instead of Main 63 Pre-IPO Cash Flow Return
Market on Assets
Example 2. Association between Ownership and Book Performance
Venture capitalist backing [+]64 Delisting
Example 3: Association between AIM vs. Non-AIM, and Market
Performance
AIM listing instead of Eighteen-month buy-and-
NASDAQ, Main Market, or _ _ _65 hold return
OTC Bulletin Board
In the first example above, selection of the AIM, instead of the
Main Market of the London Stock Exchange, has a negative correlation
with pre-IPO cash flow return on assets. Cash flow return on assets is a
book performance measure and is categorized appropriately. Further,
comparing selection of the AIM instead of the Main Market falls into the
AIM vs. Non-AIM category. Finally, the relationship is rated - - -, which
indicates that the variables move in opposite directions and the relationship
between the variables has the highest level of statistical significance,
typically a p-value of less than or equal to 0.01 as sometimes indicated with
three asterisks (***). Based on the statistical significance, the reader can
have the highest level of statistical confidence in the direction of this
relationship.
The second example above indicates that venture capitalist backing
has a positive, but statistically insignificant, relationship with delisting. The
variables are categorized as Ownership and Survival, respectively. The
rated relationship is [+], which means that while the variables move
together-backing by venture capitalist is associated with increased
delisting-there cannot be any statistical confidence in this relationship. In
cases without statistical significance, there are two important possible
63 Khurshed et al., supra note 38, at 26 tbl.3.
4 Espenlaub et al., supra note 28, at 30 tbl.9 & 31 tbl.10.
65 Gerakos et al., Post-listing Performance, supra note 17, at 198 tbl.3 & 199-200
tbl.4.
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explanations--either of which could exist in many statistically insignificant
correlations. First, the sample size could be too small for a pattern to
emerge; there may be a relationship between these variables, but a larger
sample will be required to discern a pattern. Second, there may be no
reliable relationship between the variables. Based on these two possibilities,
it is important not to draw firm conclusions from correlations without
statistical significance.
The third example above shows that a listing on the AIM, instead
of the NASDAQ, the Main Market, or the OTC Bulletin Board, has a - - -
rated relationship with eighteen-month buy-and-hold returns. An investor
buying stock in a company that lists on the AIM is more likely to find his or
her return lower after eighteen months than an investment in another
company that chose to list on the NASDAQ, the Main Market, or the OTC
Bulletin Board. Based only on this chart entry, however, the investor will
not know how much lower. Further investigation into the underlying study
reveals that AIM firms underperform a benchmark portfolio by 28.6-33.5%
after twelve months and 42.7-46.2% after twenty-four months, which is
consistent with other research.66
IV. THE AIM is NOT A PREMIER EXCHANGE
In general, companies listed on the AM dramatically underperform
their counterparts on premier exchanges such as the NASDAQ and the
Main Market of the London Stock Exchange. However, the little research
that exists comparing AIM companies with private companies or those
listed on the OTC Pink Sheets is not conclusive. The empirical findings
discussed below show that the AIM is not a premier exchange, but is
appropriately dubbed an alternative, or junior, market.
A. AIM Companies Underperform their Premier Exchange
Counterparts
Several studies compare the AIM to other exchanges or indices
such as the Main Market, the FTSE Euromid Index, the NASDAQ, and the
OTC Bulletin Board. The findings in these studies indicate that the AIM
has four substantial shortcomings when compared with these benchmarks.
First, the AIM has a strong association with lower buy-and-hold
returns performance for all measured time periods.67 Two different author
groups and three studies confirm this finding using a variety of time
66 Id. at 196.
67 See Gerakos et al., Post-listing Performance, supra note 17, at 198-99 tbl.3,
199-200 tbl.4, 203 tbl.5, 205 tbl.7, 207 tbl.8 & 208 tbl.9; see generally Vismara et
al., supra note 54.
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periods, measures, and benchmarks.68 AIM firms underperform premier
exchange benchmarks by 28.6-33.5% at twelve months and 42.7-46.2% at
twenty-four months as found by one study and 27.5% at three years and
45.7% at five years as found by another.69 These are perhaps the most
disturbing AIM statistics. Further, performance is lower for U.S. companies
exclusively listing on the AIM as compared to companies listing on an
SEC-regulated exchange.7"
While lower market performance--decreased share price over
time-may indicate that an AIM company is less economically productive
in real terms, it may also indicate that the company was initially overpriced.
In the case of this later scenario, it is not the real economic performance
that has decreased when stock performance decreases, but instead the
investor confidence in future profits as investors price the same stock lower
than they did in the past. On the AIM, each of these, to some degree, affects
the rate of return.
One problem with analyzing AIM performance in aggregate is that
the analysis could gloss over the unusually high returns generally expected
in a more risky market.7 ' In addressing this concern, one study used several
trading patterns to identify high performing firms, including doubling of
share value over the three analyzed time periods, firms upgrading from the
AIM to the Main Market, and positive returns immediately prior to
delisting-indicating a good delisting such as a merger.7 However, even
when accounting for success indicated by these trading patterns, the authors
concluded that "there is little evidence that highflying firms use the AIM
listing as a stepping stone to positive outcomes."7 3
Additionally, there is a strong association with poor market
performance for companies that raise capital at the time of listing-which
most AIM companies do not do-and for those that have retail-investor
ownership.74 The interplay between these two findings is startling for small
investors. It is unlikely that retail investors will have an opportunity to buy
shares in a company before the IPO. However, new shares issued at an IPO
provide an opportunity for retail investors to buy into the company. These
68 See Gerakos et al., Listing Choices, supra note 34, at 19 & 52 tbl.4; see also id.
at 26 & 60 tbl.12.
69 Compare Gerakos et al., Post-listing Performance, supra note 17, at 196, 198
tbl.3 & 199-200 tbl.4, with Vismara, et al., supra note 54, at 368-69 & 369 tbl.5.
70 See Gerakos et al., Listing Choices, supra note 34, at 34-35 & 61 tbl.13.
71 Id. at24.
72 See id.at 24-25.
73 Id. at 25.
74 See Gerakos et al., Post-listing Performance, supra note 17, at 207 tbl.8 & 211
tbl. 11.
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findings indicate that when investors take this opportunity, there is a strong
association with poor market performance.
Second, the AIM has a strong association with poor liquidity,
measured by the bid-ask spread and the number of days without trading, as
indicated by a zero return on a given day.75 However, larger firms on the
AIM do enjoy better liquidity.76 Poor liquidity is a bad pairing with poor
buy-and-hold returns because investors cannot reasonably expect to divest
quickly or at a reasonable price once they determine that the poor returns
will continue. Moreover, poor liquidity masks actual performance. When
there are fewer trades, the individual situations of the buyers and sellers
begin to affect the price more. For example, a seller who is desperate to sell
for a reason external to stock price, such as a personal need for cash, will
take a lower price simply for the benefit of selling. Because this trade is a
larger portion of the overall trading activity, the distortive effect of the
individual trader's motive for selling at a given price is not as diluted as it is
in a market with high trading volume.
Third, the AIM has a strong association with low survival.77 AIM
firms are more likely to fail than firms on the other exchanges.78 However,
the failure rate is not as bad as SEC Commissioner Roel Campos alleged:
thirty percent within a year.79 In the short term, up to thirty-five percent of
companies fail in the twenty-four months after IPO on the AIM.80 Failure
rates differ widely by sector. IPOs in the utilities sector had no failures
during the studied period while IPOs in the financial sector failed the
" See Gerakos et al., Listing Choices, supra note 34, at 56-57, 60-61, tbls. 8, 9, 12
& 13.
76 See id. at 28 & 56 tbl. 8; see also id at 32-33 & 60 tbl.12. Nomad selection may
also affect liquidity and market performance, although only slightly. Id. at 30-31.
A nomad serving as the broker has a strong association with better liquidity. Id.
Further, the nomads with higher average one year returns for their prior IPO
companies are strongly associated with better eighteen-month buy-and-hold
returns. Gerakos et al., Post-listing Performance, supra note 17, at 210 tbl. 10.
However, a more experienced nomad is strongly associated with poor liquidity.
Gerakos et al., Listing Choices, supra note 34, at 58 tbl.10. And a nomad with more
delistings in its past is strongly associated with poor liquidity. Id.
77 Gerakos et al., Post-listing Performance, supra note 17, at 203 tbl.5 & 204 tbl.6.
78 Gerakos et al., Listing Choices, supra note 34, at 31.
71 Compare Cohen, et al., supra note 4, at 1, with Espenlaub et al., supra note 28, at
20.
80 Espenlaub et al., supra note 28, at 20-21. Several company characteristics at the
time of IPO are associated with long-term-five year-survival. Id. at 22 & 30
tbl.9. Older age, larger size, and incorporation in the UK all correlate to higher
chances of long-term survival. Id. at 22-23 & 30 tbl.9. Further, firms operating in
financial, cyclical service, and resource sectors had higher long-term survival rates
than those operating in the technology sector. Id. Whether the firm was backed by
venture capitalist or the size of initial returns from the IPO are not significantly
correlated with long-term survival. Id.
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most.8' Additionally, United Kingdom domestic firms and firms without
venture capitalists involved performed better than their counterparts. 2
Additionally, there is a strong association with a shorter time from
listing to delisting for AIM companies.83 AIM firms, on average, have a
shorter time to delisting than firms that list on the NASDAQ.84 Similarly,
firms on both the Main Market and the OTC Bulletin Board, while having
shorter times to delisting than those on the NASDAQ, have longer times to
delisting than firms on the AIM.85 An interesting comparison, however, is
the close score of AIM companies (79.8%) to Main Market companies
(69.3%).6 This score indicates that the survival rate of Main Market
companies is closer to that of AIM companies than that of NASDAQ
companies.
Fourth, and finally, few companies graduate from the AIM to the Main
Market. From 2000 to 2004 only thirty companies transferred from the AIM
to the Main Market.87 During the same time period, 130 transferred from
the Main Market to the AIM, 8 while 594 new firms listed on the AIM and
100 listed on the Main Market.89 Another study observed that less than one
percent of companies listed on the AIM transfer to the Main Market.90
The shortcomings of the AIM are significant. These findings
indicate that the AIM is not a premier exchange based on the stock
performance, liquidity, rate of failure, and eventual graduation to the Main
Market. The AIM cannot compete with premier exchanges and should not
be viewed as an equitable alternative, but indeed a different kind of market
altogether.
B. Research is Inconclusive when Comparing AIM Performance
with Private Companies and the OTC Pink Sheets
There is little research on how AIM companies compare with their
private counterparts. But the research that exists indicates that AIM
companies do better than their private counterparts-AIM companies are
associated with more employees, more revenue, and more assets.
91
81 Id at 20.
82 Id. at21.
83 Gerakos et al., Listing Choices, supra note 34, at 32.
84 Id. at 32 & 59 tbl. 11.
85 Id. at 32.
86 Seeid. at 32, 59 tbl.11.
87 Board & Wells, supra note 24, at 212 tbls.3.1 & 3.3.
88 Id.
89 See Gerakos et al., Post-listing Performance, supra note 17, at 195 tbl. 1 (adding
listings for AIM and the Main Market for years 2000 for 2004).
90 Parsa & Kouhy, supra note 47, at 353 tbl.V.
91 Revest & Sapio, supra note 51, 968-69, 977 tbl.A3 & 978-79 tbl.A4.
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However, there is some question about how statistically significant these
data are.92 One notable negative finding, however, is that employee
productivity is lower in AIM companies. 3
Additionally, the AIM appears to underperform the OTC Pink
Sheets, though the author cautions against any firm conclusions.94 One
study indicates that an AIM listing, instead of OTC Pink Sheets, has little
association with poor market performance, as measured with buy-and-hold
returns. 95 However, another study by the same authors indicates that an
OTC Pink Sheets listing, as opposed to AIM, has a stronger association
with better market performance. While these data agree that the OTC Pink
Sheets may perform better, they do not agree on how statistically significant
this association is. Further research is required. One notable negative
finding, however, is that companies listed on the AIM are more likely to
fail before companies listed on the OTC Pink Sheets.96 This is particularly
troubling because the OTC Pink Sheets is an unregulated market.97
V. THE AIM BRIDGES THE GAP BETWEEN PRIVATE OWNERSHIP
AND PREMIER LISTING
Despite the poor performance on the AIM as compared to premier
exchanges, the AIM nevertheless fills a niche. Ownership, control, and
leverage for AIM companies do not change substantially during an IPO;
that makes AIM companies different. AIM companies are not competing at
the level expected of companies listed on a premier exchange, but the AIM
fills the space between a premier exchange listing and remaining strictly a
private company. Out of this middle ground, the AIM can play two
important roles for listed companies: First, the AIM can act as an on-ramp
to the Main Market. Second, the AIM can provide a structured liquidity
market for existing shareholders.
92 Id.
93 Id.
91 Compare Gerakos et al., Listing Choices, supra note 34, at 60 tbl. 12, with
Gerakos et al., Post-listing Performance, supra note 17, at 205 tbl.7 & 206.
95 Gerakos et al., Listing Choices, supra note 34, at 60 tbl. 12.
96 Gerakos et al., Post-listing Performance, supra note 17, at 205-06 tbl.7.
97 See OTC Market Group Inc., Our Three Tiered Marketplaces, OTCMARKETS,
http://www.otcmarkets.com/learn/otc-market-tiers (last updated April 29, 2014)
(finding that the "No Information" designation of OTC Pink "[i]ndicates companies
that are not able or willing to provide disclosure to the public markets - either to a
regulator, an exchange or OTC Markets Group").
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A. AIM IPOs are Different than Premier Exchange IPOs
Because Ownership, Control, and Leverage Do Not
Substantially Change
In contrast to traditional IPOs, major shareholders of AIM
companies do not divest ownership and control during an IPO.98 Before an
IPO on either the AIM or a premier exchange, a firm's equity is
concentrated in a few significant shareholders, including management and
venture capitalists.99 IPOs on the Main Market typically result in significant
dilution of ownership, whereas IPOs on the AIM typically do not.100 After
an IPO on the AIM, institutional investors own on average almost thirty
percent and managers hold almost twenty-four percent, leaving only forty-
six percent-minority control-for other investors. 1 1 Consolidated
ownership is a result, in part, from the mandatory one-year lockup for
companies that have not had revenue for at least two years. 10 2
Ownership and control of AIM companies is consolidated in three
shareholder groups. First, an AIM listing is strongly associated with a
higher percentage of ownership by the board before and after the IPO.'13
Further, AIM boards divest less at IPO. 1°4 The median reduction in
ownership for the board on the Main Market is twenty-nine percent as
compared to twenty-six percent on the AIM-a three-percent difference.0 5
Second, the top four shareholders in an AIM company have a
higher ownership percentage after an IPO than those shareholders have in a
Main Market company."0 6 The top four shareholders of a firm pre-IPO on
the Main Market hold a majority interest over the firm, but post-IPO the top
four shareholders typically lose control.' 7 In contrast, the top four
shareholders of IPO firms on the AIM typically do not lose their majority
98 Khurshed et al., supra note 38, at 13 & 27 tbl.4.
99 Id. at 13.100 Id.
OI Mallin & Ow-Yong, supra note 45, at 526.
102 LONDON STOCK ExCH., AIM RULES FOR COMPANIES 4 (Feb. 2010), available at
http://www.londonstockexchange.com/companies-and-
advisors/aim/advisers/rules/aim-rules-for-companies.pdf:. Where an applicant's
main activity is a business which has not been independent and earning revenue for
at least two years, it must ensure that all related parties and applicable employees
as at the date of admission agree not to dispose of any interest in its securities for
one year from the admission of its securities. Id.
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interest after the IPO.' °8 Like their board counterparts, the top four
shareholders do not divest as much of an AIM company as they would in
the Main Market. 109 The median reduction in ownership for the top four
shareholders on the Main Market is thirty-four percent where the median
reduction in ownership on the AIM is twenty-seven percent-a seven-
percent difference." 0
Third, venture capitalist investors in AIM companies divest less of
their ownership at IPO than they do in Main Market companies."' For
venture capitalists, the reduction in ownership on the Main Market is forty-
one percent as compared to twenty-six percent on the AIM-a fifteen-
percent difference.12
Moreover, two empirical findings confirm the different ownership
and control structure on the AIM. First, in AIM IPOs, companies offer a
smaller portion of existing shares relative to the whole offering; and many
IPOs on the AIM do not offer any existing shares." 3 Second, AIM IPOs
issue a smaller percentage of new equity than Main Market IPOs." 4 That
means that the ownership of current shareholders is diluted less than on the
Main Market. Overall, these correlations indicate that AIM IPOs simply
offer fewer shares-existing or new-which is consistent with the much
higher number of LiPOs on the AIM with lower, or at most comparable, total
capital raised as compared to premier exchanges." 5
Additionally, in contrast to companies on the Main Market,
companies do not permanently deleverage after an IPO on the AIM. IPOs
and debt are two significant financing tools companies use to fund
growth." 6 After an IPO on the Main Market, companies permanently
reduce their leverage thereby exchanging one mode of finance for
another--debt for equity." 7 In contrast, after an IPO on the AIM, leverage
decreases temporarily, but later returns to pre-IPO levels." 8 Higher
leverage is consistent with less equity offered at IPO; AIM companies are
not raising enough cash at IPO to satisfy their financing needs.
Consolidated ownership and higher leverage after an IPO on the
AIM is significant when evaluating the underperformance of the AIM in
comparison to premier exchanges. A substantial motivation for companies
08 Id. at 14.
109 Id.
11°Id. at 13.
111 Id. at 14-15.
112 Id. at 27 tbl.4.
113Id. at 11 & 13.
114Id.
I"5 See Gerakos et al., Post-listing Performance, supra note 17, at 195 tbl. 1.
116 Khurshed et al., supra note 38, at 18-20.
117 Id.
118 Id.
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going public on a premier exchange is to provide existing investors with an
opportunity to cash out of the venture. Further, these IPOs commonly
provide a significant influx of cash to the company for investment and
development--or at least for converting debt to equity. However, since
companies do not achieve these goals with an IPO on the AIM there must
be some alternative motivation-value-behind this decision. There are
two probable motivations for these companies listing on the AIM that
undermine the importance of the AIM's underperformance as compared to
premier exchanges: companies may seek to use the AIM as an on-ramp to a
premier public company status-including listing on the Main Market--or
may simply be looking for a structured liquidity market and a place to
grow.
B. The AIM as an On-Ramp to Premier Public Company Status
Some companies use the AIM as an on-ramp to a premier public
company status, including perhaps a listing on the Main Market. AIM
companies are smaller than their Main Market counterparts; the market
capitalization is smaller and the IPO offer size is also smaller. 19
Additionally, AIM companies do not permanently deleverage after an
IPO."2° Finally, ownership and control remain consolidated in a few major
shareholders.12 Consistent with these findings are the strong associations
between managerial ownership and less institutional ownership, and fewer
assets and fewer nonexecutive directors. 122 However, as company assets
grow, AIM companies, which were small and immature after their IPO,
develop into mature companies with similar characteristics to companies
listed on premier exchanges. As AIM companies grow, five significant
changes occur.
First, bigger companies are owned and controlled by outsiders.
With more assets, board ownership decreases, institutional investor
ownership increases, and the size of the board grows. 23 New board
members are outsiders, as would be preferred by outside investors, and they
do not hold shares.
124
Second, bigger companies deleverage. With more assets, boards
grow, companies disclose more corporate governance standard compliance,
19 Khurshed et al., supra note 38, at 26, tbl.3.
120 Id. at 18.
121 Id. at 13 & 27 tbl.4.
122 See Mallin & Ow-Yong, supra note 45, at 527 tbl.6.
123 Id.; see also MALLIN & Ow-YONG, supra note 41, at 89 tbl.5.5; Mallin & Ow-
Yong, supra note 45, at 527 tbl.6.
124 MALLIN & OW-YONG, supra note 41, at 89 tbl.5.5; Mallin & Ow-Yong, supra
note 45, at 527 tbl.6.
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and fewer directors hold shares. 125 However, these big company
characteristics are inconsistent with high leverage or gearing; instead,
higher gearing is associated with a smaller percent of nonexecutive
directors-who are less likely to hold shares-and less disclosure of
corporate governance compliance. 126 As the number of outside stakeholders
grows, company officers must reduce risk-leverage-and provide more
conservative but consistent growth. Moreover, higher leverage, which
exists in smaller companies, is associated with higher sales growth. 12 7 As
the leverage decreases based on increased assets and outside stakeholders,
sales growth decreases as well, resulting in a strong association between
higher existing sales-indicating a bigger company-and poor sales
growth. 12
8
Third, bigger companies become more transparent. As the number
of external stakeholders grows through the addition of independent
directors, institutional owners, and generally less inside control, companies
begin to disclose like their premier exchange counterparts. Transparency
increases in two areas: social information and standards of corporate
governance compliance. Increased size leads to a higher disclosure rate of
social information.'29 The more employees or creditors a company has the
more social information the company is likely to disclose. 3 ° This behavior
is similar to what is observed in larger, more studied companies.13' Despite
the limited resources in smaller companies, companies listed on the AIM
with a significant number of external stakeholders disclose social
information just like larger companies with access to more resources. 132
Some areas of particularly high disclosure include a company's principal
activity, corporate governance, reputation or branding, environmental
impact, and social responsibility.'33 However, there is little transparency
about ethical issues and investment.'34 Additionally, disclosure rates by
industry, which are closely associated with company size, confirm that size
strongly affects transparency. 135
Additionally, increased size leads to more transparency in corporate
governance. Companies listed on the AIM are not required to comply, let
125 MALLIN & OW-YONG, supra note 41, at 89 tbl.5.5; see also Mallin & Ow-Yong,
supra note 45, at 527 tbls.6 & 7.
126 See Mallin & Ow-Yong, supra note 45, at 527 tbls.6 & 7; see also MALLIN &
OW-YONG, supra note 41, at 90 tbl.5.6.
127 See Colombelli, supra note 26, at 21 tbl.3 & 22 tbl.4.
128 See id.
129 Parsa & Kouhy, supra note 47, at 356 tbls.IX & X.
130 See id.
'
31 See id. at 356.
112 See id. at 357.
113 See Parsa & Kouhy, supra note 47, at 351-52 tbl.II.
134 See id.
135 See id. at 354.
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alone disclose compliance, with corporate-governance standards. 1
36
However, the Quoted Companies Alliance (QCA) has promulgated the
Guidelines on Corporate Governance for AIM Companies.'37 While some
AIM companies may voluntarily comply with these guidelines without
disclosing their compliance, companies that disclose compliance
demonstrate corporate maturity and thereby benefit from a stronger
reputation.'38 The QCA guidelines recommend audit, remuneration, and
nomination committees, independent board members, internal controls, and
other generally accepted corporate governance practices. 3 9 Company
disclosure scores-based on the number of guidelines for which companies
disclose compliance-range from two to twenty-three, the maximum
possible score, with an average of just over thirteen. 41 Moreover,
companies with larger or more independent boards are more likely to
disclose corporate-governance-standard compliance. 141 Larger companies or
companies transferring from the Main Market to the AIM are more likely to
disclose compliance. 42 And companies that are not shells are more likely to
disclose compliance. 43 However, the percentage of institutional or manager
ownership and whether a company's nomad was also a broker had no
statistically significant relationship with disclosure rate.'"
Fourth, companies where insiders divest ownership provide a better
stock return. When there is net selling by insiders-insiders divest more
ownership than they acquire-there is an association with better buy-and-
hold returns as compared to the AIM average. 45 These companies still
suffer the first month negative correction common to all AIM IPOs;
however, these companies have a moderate association with better buy-and-
hold returns, as compared to the respective market average, from two to
eighteen months, of their Main Market counterparts. 146 The association with
better than average returns is confirmed, although not as strongly, by an
association with better than average buy-and-hold returns at twelve, twenty-
four, and thirty-six months. 14' Not only do these companies perform better,
as compared to the market average, than Main Market companies, but these
firms have a stronger association with better than average returns than
companies where insiders on balance acquire more ownership over the first
136 Mallin & Ow-Yong, supra note 45, at 516.
137 Id.
'
3 8 Id. at 516-17.
3 9 Id. at 523-24 app.
140 Id. at 524 tbl.4 (examining disclosure of twenty-three QCA recommendations).




14 Hoque & Lasfer, supra note 35, at 10-11 tbl.2.
146 Id.
147 Id.
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thirty-six months or where they conduct no net trading. 148 Net trading by
insiders is also consistent with the change in ownership and control as a
company grows; in order for control and ownership to move from insiders
to outsiders, insiders must sell their shares or have their ownership diluted.
However, companies do not have unlimited time to succeed. Worse
than average market performance beginning at eighteen months after IPO
indicates that investors eventually lose confidence, and begin to devalue the
company. There is a strong association with worse than market average
performance from nineteen to thirty-six months. 49 Also, even though not
statistically significant, there is an association with above average
performance for these companies at six, twelve, and two- through eighteen-
month buy-and-hold returns. 5 ° Then at twenty-four and thirty-six months,
the association flips to below average returns. 5 ' These data indicate that
AIM companies have a short presumption of high flying. When the
presumption runs out after a year and a half to two years, the market
corrects the price down to reflect the lesser expectation of future success.
Fifth, bigger companies grow out of the high-growth phase typical
of the small companies listing on the AIM. AIM companies are in a high-
growth phase immediately before and immediately after an IPO. Over the
period from three years pre-IPO to three years after, on average, AIM firms
grow significantly in terms of sales, total assets, and capital expenditures.
152
Growth is particularly significant around the IPO and continues thereafter,
following the expected S-curve pattern for small companies.'53 Several
small company characteristics-which are lost as the company matures-
are associated with this high-growth phase. 54 Younger and smaller





152 Colombelli, supra note 26, at 10-11. Small, young companies led by young
well-educated CEOs who have taken control from the founder grow more than
others. Id. at 21 tbl.3, 22 tbl.4 & 26. Additionally, graduating from the AIM to the
Main Market is associated, strongly in one case, with board quality. These
companies have nonexecutive board chairmen, a higher percent of nonexecutive
directors, and a larger board in the three years preceding an IPO. Vismara et al.,
supra note 54, at 380-81 & 380 tbl.9. A large board is the strongest association of
the three. Id. at 3 81. Other management characteristics evaluated but found to have
no statistically significant correlation with growth include board education, CEO
research, and CEO experience. Id. at 366 tbl.4. Finally, there is no statistically
significant correlation between firm growth and the participation of venture capital.
Colombelli, supra note 26, at 22 tbl.4.
153 Colombelli, supra note 26, at 12 fig.1.
15 4 Id. at 24.
15 5 Id.
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higher leverage also experienced higher growth. 156 The most statistically
significant firm characteristic associated with firm growth is firm size.157
Conversely, a CEO who is also the firm's founder has a negative impact on
growth.1 58
Companies that are not in a high-growth phase and list on premier
exchanges typically suffer a post-IPO slump. 59 Company performance, as
measured by return on assets ("ROA") and return on equity ("ROE"),
permanently declines after IPOs on the Main Market. 160 In contrast, ROA
and ROE increase or experience no statistically significant changes after
IPOs on the AIM.'61 No statistically significant change occurs for cash flow
return on assets ("CFROA"), return on sales ("ROS"), and asset turnover
("AT") after IPOs on either market. 62 Finally, in contrast to the AIM,
capital expenditures divided by assets decreases after an IPO on the Main
Market, indicating that company investment slows down after an IPO on
the Main Market.'63
Even with these five significant changes in bigger companies, less
than 1% of the companies listed on the AIM eventually graduate to the
Main Market, the natural premier exchange to which an AIM company
would transfer."6 However, for those companies that do graduate, there is
minimal effect on performance. The effect of switching from the AIM to
the Main Market is relatively small in both the short and long term. 165 There
is a slight long-term bump in performance (0.1%) for the companies that
switch to the AIM from the Main Market and a slight long-term decrease in
performance (-1.5%) for the small number of studied companies that switch
to the Main Market from the AIM.166 However, based on the very small
data sample-1 17 switching to the AIM and 17 switching to the Main
Market-these changes in performance are statistically suspect. 167 Limited
change in performance means that an AIM company that transferred to the
Main Market was already performing like a Main Market company before it
made the switch.
These data indicate that it is the company growth, not the market or
regulatory model, that prepares companies for a premier exchange listing.
156 Id.
157 Id. at 22 tbl.4.158 Id. at 22 tbl.4.
159 Khurshed et al., supra note 38, at 3.
16 0 1d. at 16-18 & 28 tbl.5.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id. at 18-20 & 29 tbl.6.
16 Parsa & Kouhy, supra note 47, at 353 tbl.V.
165 Board & Wells, supra note 24, at 225-26.
166 Id. at 222 tbl.3.2 & 225 tbl.3.3.
167 Id. at 225 tbl.3.3.
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The AIM, which is flexible enough to list both small and large companies,
allows small companies to gradually mature in a public market
environment. When a company is ready to transition to a premier exchange,
the transition is smooth. Additionally, companies that could transition to a
premier exchange may instead simply stay listed on the AIM to take
advantage of the lighter regulatory burden while still enjoying a reputation
similar to those listed on premier exchanges.
C. The AIM as a Structured Liquidity Market
For those companies that cannot or do not want to list on a premier
exchange, the AIM provides value for shareholders as a structured market
good enough for liquidity. Companies and their shareholders benefit when
there is a secondary market available for shares. New investors are more
likely to infuse cash, with the hope of being able to sell shares in the future.
Existing investors asked to increase their investment are less likely to feel
backed into a comer when they can already sell their existing shares.
Further, companies are able to provide stock compensation more easily to
employees, costing the company less than cash compensation and aligning
the interests of employees with the success of the company. The employees
value stock compensation more when there is a secondary market available
than if they are stuck with shares that are difficult to sell. Some of these
benefits are available for private companies using issuer-sponsored
secondary markets,168 but the AIM, as a public, structured, and regulated
exchange, can provide more value for investors and companies. There are
five ways the AIM provides value to shareholders as a structured public
marketplace that private markets cannot offer.
First, the AIM reduces the transaction cost. The AIM is operated by
the London Stock Exchange,'169 no doubt an expert in operating world-class
exchanges. Investors on the AIM are therefore able to enjoy all the benefits
of this expertise, which results in low transaction friction and wide
availability.' Investors, no matter who they are, are able to buy and sell on
the AIM without the need of special broker expertise, issuer-sponsored
secondary markets, or a difficult search for willing counterparties in an
opaque private market.' 7 ' The importance of reducing transaction friction
cannot be overstated. Not only can substantial transaction barriers exist in
the private market, but the relative burden of those barriers is more
significant in a market with lower volume and more risk because investors
recognize that there are additional costs and barriers to getting out of an
investment that has already sustained losses. Further, because the overhead
168 See About SharesPost, supra note 7; Secondary Transactions, supra note 7.
169 Stuttard, supra note 8.
170 See LSE, Growth Market, supra note 10.
171 See id. at 6.
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costs of sustaining the market are shared among the many companies on the
AIM and, indeed, the whole London Stock Exchange, these companies get
the benefit of an economy of scale even though the individual scale of any
one company would never sustain similar transaction benefits. While
secondary market providers such as SharesPost or SecondMarket may
provide similarly lowered transaction costs, the expertise of the London
Stock Exchange is a huge asset for the AIM, which these other providers do
not enjoy.172
Second, the AIM provides confidence in the class of securities held.
Private stock holdings may be inhibited with special stock classes, rules, or
restrictions. 173 However, on the AIM, stock holdings are standardized,
giving confidence that what an investor is buying or selling is of a
specifically admitted class of securities with clear limitations and rights.1 74
Further, companies can only list stock that conforms to the generally
accepted standards of common stock.175 An investor selecting from one of
two listed companies can be confident that while the stocks may differ in
price and the underlying value of the company, they represent similar
property interests. In contrast, a private company facilitating a private
secondary stock market for its shareholders can set its own rules and need
not conform to generally accepted standards. 176
Third, the AIM provides pricing transparency. With a public
clearing house of transaction information, investors are able to track and
appropriately price stocks. 177 In contrast, an investor in private securities
may not know at what price the securities have recently traded.'78 While
this information may not be as clear as it is on a premier exchange, it is
clearer than a strictly private market. Further, even though limited liquidity
will reduce pricing accuracy, the increased access to transaction data allows
investors to better estimate an accurate price because, presumably,
statistical analysis of previous trading patterns on similarly less liquid
172 See About SharesPost, supra note 7; Secondary Transactions, supra note 7.




176 Secondary Transactions, supra note 7 ("Configure your transaction according to
your parameters - who can buy, who can sell, how much, and the price.").
177 See AIM Indices, London Stock Exchange,
http://www.londonstockexchange.com/exchange/companies-and-
advisors/aim/indices/indices.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2014).
178 Cf Secondary Transactions, supra note 7 ("You control access to the secure
environment for both buyers and sellers."). Data privacy with regard to a secondary
market for a private issuer's shares is especially important because the issuer does
not want outside analysts evaluating trading patterns of insiders to determine
company health or worth. However, without outside expert analysis, investors
cannot be sure of accurate pricing.
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stocks will inform an appropriate price estimation. Moreover, the pricing
transparency of an individual stock is increased in the context of a broader
market of similar companies. Because investors can quickly compare one
company against another, an overpriced stock based on the performance
fundamentals can be more quickly identified than if it were operating in
more isolation as a private company.
Fourth, the AIM provides an active regulatory authority that will
respond to maintain the reputational integrity of the market. While the AIM
must balance regulation with the goal of lower barriers to listing, it will
staunchly protect its interest in the operation of the exchange. The almost
twenty-year survival of the exchange through the dot com bubble of 2000
and the great recession of 2008 are a testament to the AIM's ability to adapt
to meet difficult times. No doubt AIM companies suffered, and many
failed, during these financial downturns,179 but the AIM continues to
flourish as a reputable exchange for growing companies. Essential to the
reputational integrity of the exchange is adequate oversight of listed
companies. By providing just enough regulatory oversight, companies and
investors find value and continue to list and invest. Further, this regulatory
authority is able to respond to patterns of abuse and industry best practices
to prevent future failures without burdening growth.
Fifth, by listing on the AIM, companies subject themselves to
greater external oversight than private companies, further aligning the
interests of the company with those of its investors. By listing, companies
subject themselves to the regulatory oversight of a nomad and the London
Stock Exchange. 8 ° Companies can be forcibly delisted for misconduct, a
swifter punishment than securities fraud, for example, which could take
years to resolve in court. 8 Further, companies must bring in an outside
nomad as an internal regulator.182 While the company selects its own
nomad and may nevertheless obstruct thorough investigation, an outsider
with inside access increases the opportunity for exposure of corporate
wrongdoing in a similar way an independent auditor does.
For companies seeking a structured liquidity market, the AIM can
be a good match. The AIM can provide the right alternative for a small
company seeking to grow, but which is not large enough to list on a premier
exchange and whose shareholders demand more than a private market.
While investors with large holdings will not be able to completely divest on
the AIM, the exchange provides liquidity around the margins. For example,
for a founder who holds many shares and does not want to fully exit the
venture, but nevertheless needs some cash, the AIM provides a way to sell
179 See Gerakos et al., Listing Choices, supra note 34, at 48 tbl. 1.
180 LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE, supra note 170, at 6.
181 See John Cowie, Being on AIM in A GUIDE TO AIM 60 (Nigel Page ed., 2010).
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some shares. Similarly, an employee who participates in stock
compensation can sell some shares to convert that compensation into cash.
Particularly for a company that uses stock compensation for many
employees, the ease of access for these investors allows unsophisticated
employees to trade shares more easily. By allowing retail investors to trade
on the AIM, employees do not have to worry about going through a specific
issuer provided portal to sell their shares. Instead, each employee, who is
likely a retail investor in level of sophistication, can use his own investment
broker to buy and sell shares.
Moreover, while major investors may not want to completely divest
from the venture, a growing, liquid market allows them to gradually divest
over time. Especially for investors who hold large interests in a company,
but are not wealthy enough to have other investments sufficient to diversify
their holdings, slow divestment provides a way to diversify. For example,
an early member of a company may be quite wealthy based on his holdings
in the one company. However, since such company ownership is the
primary object of wealth, an individual's financial future is closely tied to
the success of the company. Such an individual may desire to diversify
wealth somewhat to hedge risk exposure in the company. While this
investor may prefer a traditional IPO that creates a large market for shares,
he is likely to jump at the opportunity of a limited market earlier.
Additionally, company owners may have a legitimate reason for not
wanting to go through the traditional IPO process, but nonetheless benefit
from a limited, liquid market. Recently, several notable companies have
gone private to realize the benefits of consolidated control.'83 These
companies, or those that stay private for the same reason, can benefit from
providing some liquidity.'84 For example, stock compensation for
employees and ownership consolidation.
Finally, if a company utilizes the AIM as a structured liquidity
market, the company may trade in its own stock to grease the market for the
benefit of its shareholders. For example, a company may identify a target
stock price based on an internal valuation of the company. The company
may allocate some funds for the purpose of trading in its own stock to
maintain this price, buying when the market price is below the target and
selling when it is above. Additionally, the company may simply buy or sell
stocks to provide some market volume. Assuming the company targets a net
break-even point in its trading activities, this activity will provide liquidity
in the market without creating over- or underpricing. This kind of program
183 E.g., Ian Sherr, et al., Dell Makes Case to Go Private in Grim Filing, THE WALL
STREET JOURNAL (Updated Mar. 29, 2013),
http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB 1000142412788732350100457839069226860564
4.
184 See About SharesPost, supra note 7; Secondary Transactions, supra note 7.
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would be especially helpful to bridge any liquidity gap for small investors,
like stock compensated employees, who simply need the cash.
In sum, companies listing on the AIM are different from their
premier exchange counterparts based on the lack of substantial change in
ownership, control, and leverage. However, as AIM companies grow, they
mature. For those few companies that achieve premier public company
status, including possibly graduating to the Main Market, the AIM provides
a gradual on-ramp. For the many companies that will never list on a premier
exchange, the AIM provides a structured liquidity market for shareholders,
allowing them to more confidently trade their stocks.
VI. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The AIM is an experiment in light regulation. It tailors regulation to
small companies while trying to maintain the quality needed for an
exchange to operate. The empirical literature identifies both positive and
negative aspects of the AIM. While AIM companies underperform those on
premier exchanges, the AIM has helped a significant number of companies
raise capital and grow. In particular, the AIM bridges the gap for companies
between a premier exchange listing and staying private. Regulators and
academics in the U.S. should strongly consider the example of the AIM and
the possible benefit an AIM-type market could-provide to companies and
shareholders in the U.S.
Further study and analysis is required to render a final verdict on
the success of the AIM and light exchange regulation. The literature
highlights several areas for further study and analysis. First, further study is
required to compare AIM companies with their private counterparts. This
study should focus on survival, likelihood of ultimate public listing on a
premier exchange, and value to shareholders as a structured liquidity
market. Second, further study should be conducted to compare the
institutional ownership rate on the AIM with that of other exchanges. Third,
further study is needed to compare the concentration of ownership of
companies on the AIM with those on premier exchanges. Fourth, further
study is needed into the rate of fraud on the AIM as compared to other
companies. Fifth, and finally, further study is required to determine the
connection between raising funds on the AIM, retail investor ownership,
and poor market performance.
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AIM listing instead of Main 187 Asset Turnover at IPO
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associations are between variables measuring the AIM and its companies. The AIM
vs. Non-AIM associations identify differences in dependent variables correlated
with listing on the AIM instead of another option. This section, for example, lists
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AIM listing instead of Main _ 200 Number of employees at IPO
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Market
AIM listing instead of + +202 Discretionary accruals
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AIM listing instead of _ _ 203 Discretionary accruals change
NASDAQ, Main Market, or after IPO
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AIM listing instead of +204 Discretionary accruals change
NASDAQ, Main Market, or from before to after IPO
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AIM listing instead of -- _205 Discretionary accruals reversal
NASDAQ, Main Market, or in year after IPO
OTC Bulletin Board
194 Id.
195 Revest & Sapio, supra note 51, at 25 tbl.A3 & 27 tbl.A4 (some models indicate
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D. Associations Between AIM vs. Non-AIM and Market Liquidity
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207 Khurshed et al., supra note 38, at 26 tbl.3.
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210 Gerakos et al., Listing Choices, supra note 34, at 56-57 tbls.8-9 & 60-61
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213 Id.214 Hoque & Lasfer, supra note 35, at 10 tbl.2.
THE OHIO STATE ENTREPRENEURIAL
BUSINESS LA WJOURNAL
Aim iisting insteai ot Main
Market [+]215
I weive-monm ouy-ana-noa
return, compared to market
average
AIM listing instead of Main Twenty-four month buy-and-
Market [_]216 hold return, compared to
market average
AIM listing instead of Main Thirty-six-month buy-and-hold
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AIM listing instead of Main [+]218 Six-month buy-and-hold return,
Market compared to market average
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AIM listing instead of Main Month two to eighteen buy-
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Market, where there is net [+]222 return, compared to market
buying by insiders for the first average
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compared to market average
AIM listing instead of Main Month nineteen to thirty-six
Market, where there is net [_]226 buy-and-hold return, compared
buying by insiders for the first to market average
thirty-six months
AIM listing instead of Main Month two to eighteen buy-
Market, where there is net [+]227 and-hold return, compared to
buying by insiders for the first market average
thirty-six months
AIM listing instead of Main One-month buy-and-hold
Market, where there is net 228 return, compared to market
selling by insiders for the first average
thirty-six months
AIM listing instead of Main Twelve-month buy-and-hold
Market, where there is net +229 return, compared to market
selling by insiders for the first average
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AIM listing instead of Main Twenty-four-month buy-and-
Market, where there is net +230 hold return, compared to
selling by insiders for the first market average
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AIM listing instead of Main Thirty-six-month buy-and-hold
Market, where there is net +231 return, compared to market
selling by insiders for the first average
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AIM listing instead of Main Six-month buy-and-hold return,
Market, where there is net [+]232 compared to market average
selling by insiders for the first
thirty-six months
AIM listing instead of Main Month nineteen to thirty-six
Market, where there is net [_]233 buy-and-hold return, compared
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AIM listing instead of Main [_]237 Twenty-four-month buy-and-
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Market, where there is no return, compared to market
trading by insiders for the first average
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Market, where there is no and-hold return, compared to
trading by insiders for the first market average
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AIM listing instead of _ 244 Twelve-month buy-and-hold
NASDAQ, Main Market, or returns for firms that have an
OTC Bulletin Board increase in discretionary
accruals
AIM listing instead of - - -245 Twelve-month buy-and-hold
NASDAQ, Main Market, or returns for firms that raise
OTC Bulletin Board capital
AIM listing instead of _ _ 246 Twelve-month buy-and-hold
NASDAQ, Main Market, or returns over 100%
OTC Bulletin Board
AIM listing instead of - - 247 Eighteen-month buy-and-hold
NASDAQ, Main Market, or return
OTC Bulletin Board
AIM listing instead of _ 248 Eighteen-month buy-and-hold
NASDAQ, Main Market, or return over 200%
OTC Bulletin Board
AIM listing instead of - 249 Eighteen-month buy-and-hold
NASDAQ, Main Market, or returns before and after AIM
OTC Bulletin Board reforms of 2007
AIM listing instead of 250 Eighteen-month buy-and-hold
NASDAQ, Main Market, or returns for firms that have an
OTC Bulletin Board increase in discretionary
accruals
AIM listing instead of 251 Eighteen-month buy-and-hold
NASDAQ, Main Market, or returns for firms that raise
OTC Bulletin Board capital
AIM listing instead of - - -252 Eighteen-month buy-and-hold
NASDAQ, Main Market, or returns over 100%
OTC Bulletin Board
AIM listing instead of - - -253 Twenty-four-month buy-and-
NASDAQ, Main Market, or hold return
OTC Bulletin Board
243 Id. at 203 tbl.5.
244 Id. at 208 tbl.9.
245 Id. at 207 tbl.8.
246 Gerakos et al., Listing Choices, supra note 34, at 48 tbl.7.
247 Gerakos et al., Post-listing Performance, supra note 17, at 198 tbl.3 & 199 tbl.4.
248 Id. at 203 tbl.5.
249 Id. at 205 tbl.7.
250 Id. at 208 tbl.9.
251 Id. at 207 tbl.8.
252 Gerakos et al., Listing Choices, supra note 34, at 48 tbl.7.
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NASDAQ, Main Market, or hold returns over 200%
OTC Bulletin Board
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OTC Bulletin Board
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AIM listing instead of OTC 259 Eighteen-month buy-and-hold
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AIM listing instead of OTC [_j260 Twenty-four-month buy-and-
Pink Sheets hold returns
OTC Pink Sheets listing + + +261 Twelve-month buy-and-hold
instead of AIM return
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instead of AIM return
OTC Pink Sheets listing +263 Twenty-four-month buy-and-
instead of AIM hold return
F. Associations Between AIM vs. Non-AIM and Ownership
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IPO
253 Gerakos et al., Post-listing Performance, supra note 17, at 198 tbl.3 & 199 tbl.4.
254 Id. at 208 tbl.9.
255 Id. at 207 tbl.8.
256 Id. at 203 tbl.5.
257 Id. at 199 tbl.4.
258 Gerakos et al., Listing Choices, supra note 34, at 53 tbl.12.
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262 Id.
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AIM listing instead of Main ++ +266 Ownership percentage by board
Market shareholders pre-IPO
AIM listing instead of Main Top four shareholders
Market - - 267 ownership percentage change
from pre- to post-IPO
AIM listing instead of Main ++ +268 Top four shareholders
Market ownership percentage post-IPO
AIM listing instead of Main [+]269 Top four shareholders
Market ownership percentage pre-IPO
AIM listing instead of Main Venture capitalist shareholder
Market - - -270 ownership percentage change
from pre- to post-IPO
AIM listing instead of Main Venture capitalist shareholder
Market [+]271 ownership percentage post-IPO
AIM listing instead of Main Venture capitalist shareholder
Market [_] 272  ownership percentage pre-IPO
G. Associations Between AIM vs. Non-AIM and Company Survival
AIM listing instead of Good delisting, defined as
NASDAQ, Main Market, or - - 273 positive returns twenty days
OTC Bulletin Board prior to delisting
AIM listing instead of Good delisting, defined as
NASDAQ, Main Market, or -274 positive returns forty days prior
OTC Bulletin Board to delisting
AIM listing instead of Good delisting, defined as
NASDAQ, Main Market, or - - -275 positive returns sixty days prior
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tlIvI 1StLn1g m1steaU 01
NASDAQ, Main Market, OTC
Bulletin Board, or OTC Pink
Sheets
+XL+7UC1dL, U L1IC L lIIlU
+ + +276
H. Associations Between Auditor Characteristics and Company Characteristics2 77
Auditor quality, defined as the Assets
company's auditor, is one of + + +278
the "big four"
Auditor quality, defined as the Board quality, defined as
company's auditor, is one of . _279 percent of directors holding
the "big four" shares
Auditor quality, defined as the Board quality, defined as size
company's auditor, is one of + + +280
the "big four"
Auditor quality, defined as the Disclosure of corporate
company's auditor, is one of [+]281 governance standards
the "big four" compliance
I. Associations Between Auditor Characteristics and Market Performance
Auditor quality, defined as the Eighteen-month buy-and-hold
company's auditor, is one of ++ +282 returns
the biggest five international
auditing firms
J. Associations Between Auditor Characteristics and Company Survival
Auditor quality, defined as the Market switching from Main
company's auditor, is one of [+]283 Market to AIM
the "big four"
276 Id. at 204 tbl.6; Gerakos et al., Listing Choices, supra note 34, at 61 tbl. 13.
277 As discussed above, see supra note 186, associations that do not expressly
indicate comparison of non-AIM variables include only AIM-related correlations.
In this case, for example, the correlations are between characteristics of AIM
auditors, such as being one of the big four, and AIM company characteristics, such
as the amount of total assets.
278 MALLIN & OW-YONG, supra note 41, at 89 tbl.5.5.
279 Mallin & Ow-Yong, supra note 44, at 30 tbl.6.
280 MALLIN & OW-YONG, supra note 41, at 89 tbl.5.5.
28 1 Id. at 90 tbl.5.6.
282 Gerakos et al., Post-listing Performance, supra note 17, at 210 tbl. 10.
283 MALLIN & OW-YONG, supra note 41, at 89 tbl.5.5.
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K. Associations Between Book Performance and Book Performance
Gearing +284 Sales Growth
Sales - - 285 Sales Growth
L. Associations Between Book Performance and Company Characteristics
Assets Board quality, defined as
- - _286 percent of directors holding
shares
Assets ++ +287 Board quality, defined as size
Assets and any turnover Disclosure of corporate
++ +288 governance standards
compliance
Gearing [+]289 Assets
Gearing Board quality, defined as
+290 percent of directors holding
shares
Gearing Board quality, defined as
_ 291 percent of nonexecutive
directors
Gearing [_]292 Board quality, defined as size
Gearing Disclosure of corporate
- 293 governance standards
compliance
Gearing +294 Disclosure of social
information
284 Colombelli, supra note 26, at 21 tbl.3 & 22 tbl.4.
2851d
"
286 Mallin & Ow-Yong, supra note 45, at 527 tbl.6.
287 Id.; MALLIN & Ow-YONG, supra note 41, at 89 tbl.5.5.
288 MALLIN & OW-YONG, supra note 41, at 90 tbl.5.6; Mallin & Ow-Yong, supra
note 45, at 527 tbl.7.
289 MALLIN & OW-YONG, supra note 41, at 89 tbl.5.5; Mallin & Ow-Yong, supra
note 45, at 527 tbl.6.
290 Mallin & Ow-Yong, supra note 45, at 527 tbl.6.
291 Id.
292 Id.; MALLIN & OW-YONG, supra note 41, at 89 tbl.5.5.
293 MALLIN & OW-YONG, supra note 41, at 90 tbl.5.6; Mallin & Ow-Yong, supra
note 45, at 527 tbl.7.
294 Parsa & Kouhy, supra note 47, at 356 tbl.X.
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MarKet t-apitalzation [+]295 uisciosure or sociaiinformation
Revenue / Turnover ++ +296 Disclosure of social
+ + ±information
M. Associations Between Book Performance and IPO Characteristics
Market Capitalization Initial return, defined as market
[+]297 capitalization at close of listing
date less IPO proceeds
N. Associations Between Book Performance and Company Survival
Assets [+]298 Market switching from Main
Market to AIM
Gearing [+]299 Market switching from Main
Market to AIM
Market Capitalization 300 Good delisting, defined as
merger or acquisition
Market Capitalization + + +301 Survival time
0. Associations Between CEO Characteristics and Book Performance
CEO quality, defined as age 302 Sales Growth
CEO quality, defined as CEO 303 Sales Growth
is also the company founder
CEO quality, defined as the Sales Growth
CEO has previous experience [_]304
on other firms' board of
directors
295 Id. at 356 tbl.IX.
296 Id.
297 Espenlaub et al., supra note 28, at 38 app. tbl.1.
298 MALLIN & OW-YONG, supra note 41, at 89 tbl.5.5; Mallin & Ow-Yong, supra
note 45, at 527 tbl.6.
299 MALLIN & OW-YONG, supra note 41, at 89 tbl.5.5; Mallin & Ow-Yong, supra
note 45, at 527 tbl.6.
30 Espenlaub et al., supra note 28, at 29 tbl.8.
301 Id. at 30 tbl.9 & 31 tbl.10.
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%_ZAj quality, uU1iiieu UN iiie
CEO received a post-graduate
degree, such as MA, MSc,
MBIM, MRPharm, MBE, or
MBA
+ +305
CEO quality, defined as the Sales Growth
CEO holds a title such as PhD, [_]306
Dr, Prof, or OBE as reported in
the IPO prospectus
P. Associations Between Company Characteristics and Book Performance
Age 307 Sales Growth
Board quality, defined as at Sales Growth
least one director who received
at least an undergraduate
degree
Q. Associations Between Certain Company Characteristics
Age Disclosure of corporate
- - 309 governance standards
compliance
Age [+]310 Disclosure of social
information
Board quality, defined as Assets
percent of nonexecutive [+]311
directors
Board quality, defined as Board quality, defined as
percent of nonexecutive - - 312 percent of directors holding
directors shares
Board quality, defined as Board quality, defined as size






309 MALLIN & Ow-YONG, supra note 41, at 90 tbl.5.6.
310 Parsa & Kouhy, supra note 47, at 352 tbl.JII.
311 Mallin & Ow-Yong, supra note 45, at 527 tbl.6.
312 Id.
313 Id.
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Board quality, defined as size + + +315 Assets
Board quality, defined as size Board quality, defined as
[+]316 percent of nonexecutive
directors
Board quality, defined as size Disclosure of corporate
+ + +317 governance standards
compliance
Employees, number of [+]318 Disclosure of social
information
R. Associations Between Company Characteristics and IPO Characteristics
Age Initial return, defined as market
[_]319 capitalization at close of listing
date less IPO proceeds
S. Associations Between Company Characteristics and Company Survival
Age [_]320 Good delisting, defined as
merger or acquisition
Age + + +321 Survival time
Board quality, defined as Market switching from Main
percent of nonexecutive [_]322 Market to AIM
directors
Board quality, defined as size [_]323 Market switching from Main
Market to AIM
UK domicile instead of non- + + +324 Survival time
UK
314 Id. at 527 tbl.7.
315 Id. at 527 tbl.6; MALLIN & Ow-YONG, supra note 41, at 89 tbl.5.5.
316 Mallin & Ow-Yong, supra note 45, at 527 tbl.6.
317 Id. at 527 tbl.7; MALLIN & OW-YONG, supra note 41, at 90 tbl.5.6.
318 Parsa & Kouhy, supra note 47, at 356 tbl.IX.
319 Espenlaub et al., supra note 28, at 38 app. tbl.1.
320 Id. at 29 tbl.8.
321 1d. at 30 tbl.9 & 31 tbl.10.
322 Mallin & Ow-Yong, supra note 45, at 527 tbl.6.
323 Id.; MALLIN & Ow-YONG, supra note 41, at 89 tbl.5.5.
324 Espenlaub et al., supra note 28, at 30 tbl.9 & 31 tbl.10.
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T. Associations Between Company Industry and Company Characteristics
Financial Services [H]325 Assets
Financial Services [_]326 Board quality, defined as
percent of directors holding
shares
Financial Services [_]327 Board quality, defined as size
Manufacturing - 328 Assets
Manufacturing [_]329 Board quality, defined as
percent of directors holding
shares
Manufacturing [+]330 Board quality, defined as size
Manufacturing [+]331 Disclosure of corporate
governance standards
compliance
Nonfinancial Services [+]332 Assets
Nonfinancial Services ++ +333 Board quality, defined as
percent of directors holding
shares
Nonfinancial Services [_]334 Board quality, defined as size




Resources - - 337 Board quality, defined as
percent of directors holding
shares
Resources [+]338 Board quality, defined as size






331 Id. at 31 tbl.7.
332 Id. at 30 tbl.6.
333 Id.
334 Id.
335 Id. at 31 tbl.7.
336 Id. at 30 tbl.6.
337 Id.
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Resources ] Disclosure of corporate
governance standards
compliance
U. Associations Between Company Industry and Company Survival
Cyclical Services []340 Good delisting, defined as
merger or acquisition
Cyclical Services ++ +341 Survival time "t
Financial Services [_]342 Market switching from Main
Market to AIM
Financials 343 Good delisting, defined as
merger or acquisition
Financials + +344 Survival time
Manufacturing [+]345 Market switching from Main
Market to AIM
Nonfinancial Services [+]346 Market switching from Main
Market to AIM
Resources 347 Good delisting, defined as
merger or acquisition
Resources 348 Market switching from Main
Market to AIM
Resources + + +349 Survival time
V. Associations Between IPO Characteristics and Book Performance
0 to 1 Years Post-IPO 350 Asset Turnover
0 to 1 Years Post-IPO [+]351 Capital Expenditures Over
Total Assets
338 Id.
3 39 Id. at 31 tbl.7.
340 Espenlaub et al., supra note 28, at 29 tbl.8.
341 Id. at 30 tbl.9 & 31 tbl.10.
342 Mallin & Ow-Yong, supra note 44, at 30 tbl.6.
343 Espenlaub et al., supra note 28, at 29 tbl.8.
344Id. at30 tbl.9 & 31 tbl.10.
341 Mallin & Ow-Yong, supra note 44, at 30 tbl.6.
346 Id.
34' Espenlaub et al., supra note 28, at 29 tbl.8.
348 Mallin & Ow-Yong, supra note 44, at 30 tbl.6.
349 Espenlaub et al., supra note 28, at 30 tbl.9 & 31 tbl. 10.
350 Khurshed et al., supra note 38, at 28 tbl.5.
351 Id. at 29 tbl.6.
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352 Id.





358 Id. at 29 tbl.6.
359 Gerakos et al., Post-listing Performance, supra note 17, at 207 tbl.8.
360 Id.
361 Id.
362 Espenlaub et al., supra note 28, at 30 tbl.9 & 31 tbl.10.
363 Vismara et al., supra note 54, at 380 tbl.9.
0 to 3 Years Post-IPO [+]353 Cash Flow Return on Assets
0 to 3 Years Post-IPO +354 Return on Assets
0 to 3 Years Post-IPO [+]355 Return on Equity
0 to 3 Years Post-IPO [+]356 Return on Sales
2 to 3 Years Post-IPO [+]357 Asset Turnover
2 to 3 Years Post-IPO +358 Leverage
W. Associations Between IPO Characteristics and Market Performance
Raising capital instead of - - 359 Twelve-month buy-and-hold
listing only returns
Raising capital instead of _ 360 Eighteen-month buy-and-hold
listing only returns
Raising capital instead of - 36 1 Twenty-four-month buy-and-
listing only I hold returns
X. Associations Between IPO Characteristics and Company Survival
IPO Initial Return [+]362 Survival time
Y. Associations Between Market Switching and Company Characteristics
Market switching from the +363 Board quality, defined as
AIM to the Main Market nonexecutive Board Chairman
from three years before to three
years after IPO
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Market switching from the
AIM to the Main Market
thoard quality, aetinea as
percent of nonexecutive
directors from three years
before to three years after IPO
Market switching from the + + +365 Board quality, defined as size
AIM to the Main Market from three years before to three
years after IPO
Market switching from the [+]366 Board quality, defined as split
AIM to the Main Market CEO and Board Chairman
positions from three years
before to three years after IPO
Market switching from the [+]367 Assets
Main Market to the AIM
Market switching from the [_]368 Board quality, defined as
Main Market to the AIM nonexecutive Board Chairman
from three years before to three
years after market switch
Market switching from the [+]369 Board quality, defined as
Main Market to the AIM percent of directors holding
shares
Market switching from the [_]370 Board quality, defined as
Main Market to the AIM percent of nonexecutive
directors
Market switching from the [+]371 Board quality, defined as
Main Market to the AIM percent of nonexecutive
directors from three years
before to three years after
market switch
Market switching from the [_]372 Board quality, defined as size
Main Market to the AIM
Market switching from the [+]373 Board quality, defined as size
Main Market to the AIM from three years before to three




367 MALLIN & OW-YONG, supra note 41, at 89 tbl.5.5; Mallin & Ow-Yong, supra
note 45, at 527 tbl.6
368 Vismara et al., supra note 54, at 380 tbl.9.
369 Mallin & Ow-Yong, supra note 45, at 527 tbl.6.
370 Id.
371 Vismara et al., supra note 54, at 380 tbl.9.
372 MALLIN & OW-YONG, supra note 41, at 89 tbl.5.5; Mallin & Ow-Yong, supra
note 45, at 527 tbl.6.
373 Vismara et al., supra note 54, at 380 tbl.9.
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VIIKf:L MWalt tollg t m AIMMain Market to the AIM 0aru quaty, aenneo as srCEO and Board Chairman
positions from three years
before to three years after
market switch
Market switching from the + +375 Disclosure of corporate
Main Market to the AIM governance standards
compliance
Z. Associations Between Nomad Characteristics and Company Characteristics
Nomad quality, defined as the [+]376 Assets
Nomad is the broker
Nomad quality, defined as the [_]377 Board quality, defined as
Nomad is the broker percent of directors holding
shares
Nomad quality, defined as the [+]378  Board quality, defined as
Nomad is the broker percent of nonexecutive
directors
Nomad quality, defined as the [+]379 Board quality, defined as size
Nomad is the broker
Nomad quality, defined as the [_]380 Disclosure of corporate
Nomad is the broker governance standards
compliance
AA. Associations Between Nomad Characteristics and Market Liquidity
Nomad quality, defined as the [+]381 Bid-Ask Spread
natural logarithm of the
number of total delistings of
offerings brought to the AIM
by the Nomad prior the IPO
374 Id.
375 MALLIN & OW-YONG, supra note 41, at 90 tbl.5.6; Mallin & Ow-Yong, supra
note 45, at 527 tbl.7.
376 MALLIN & OW-YONG, supra note 41, at 89 tbl.5.5; Mallin & Ow-Yong, supra
note 45, at 527 tbl.6.
377 Mallin & Ow-Yong, supra note 45, at 527 tbl.6.
378 Id.
379 MALLIN & OW-YONG, supra note 41, at 89 tbl.5.5; Mallin & Ow-Yong, supra
note 45, at 527 tbl.6.
380 MALLIN & OW-YONG, supra note 41, at 90 tbl.5.6; Mallin & Ow-Yong, supra
note 45, at 527 tbl.7.
381 Gerakos et al., Listing Choices, supra note 34, at 58 tbl. 10.
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Nomad quality, defined as the
natural logarithm of the
number of total delistings of
offerings brought to the AIM
by the Nomad prior the IPO
Trading days with zero returns
Nomad quality, defined as the + + +383 Bid-Ask Spread
natural logarithm of the
number of total public
offerings brought to the AIM
by the Nomad prior the IPO
Nomad quality, defined as the ++ +384 Trading days with zero returns
natural logarithm of the
number of total public
offerings brought to the AIM
by the Nomad prior the IPO
BB. Associations Between Nomad Characteristics and Market Liquidity
Nomad quality, defined as the Bid-Ask Spread
natural logarithm of the
number of total delistings of [+]385
offerings brought to the AIM
by the Nomad prior the IPO
Nomad quality, defined as the Trading days with zero returns
natural logarithm of the
number of total delistings of ++ +386
offerings brought to the AIM
by the Nomad prior the IPO
Nomad quality, defined as the Bid-Ask Spread
natural logarithm of the
number of total public + + +387
offerings brought to the AIM
by the Nomad prior the IPO
Nomad quality, defined as the Trading days with zero returns
natural logarithm of the
number of total public + + +388
offerings brought to the AIM
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iromau quality, ueiinea as me
natural logarithm of the total
capital raised by the Nomad
prior the IPO
[_] 389
Nomad quality, defined as the Trading days with zero returns
natural logarithm of the total + +390
capital raised by the Nomad
prior the IPO
Nomad quality, defined as the [+]391 Bid-Ask Spread
Nomad is an auditor
Nomad quality, defined as the [_]392 Trading days with zero returns
Nomad is an auditor
Nomad quality, defined as the 393 Bid-Ask Spread
Nomad is the broker
Nomad quality, defined as the [+1394 Trading days with zero returns
Nomad is the broker
CC. Associations Between Nomad Characteristics and Market Performance
Nomad quality, defined as the Eighteen-month buy-and-hold
average twelve-month return returns
for all of the firms brought to + + +395
market by a particular Nomad
prior to the current listing.
Nomad quality, defined as the Eighteen-month buy-and-hold
natural logarithm of the returns
number of delistings of [+]396
offerings brought to the AIM
by the Nomad prior the firm's
listing
Nomad quality, defined as the Eighteen-month buy-and-hold
natural logarithm of the returns
number of total public [+]397








395 Gerakos et al., Post-listing Performance, supra note 17, at 210 tbl. 10.
396 Gerakos et al., Listing Choices, supra note 34, at 54 tbl.6.
397 Id.
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Nomad quality, defined as the
natural logarithm of the total
capital raised by the Nomad




Nomad quality, defined as the [+]399 Eighteen-month buy-and-hold
Nomad is an auditor returns
Nomad quality, defined as the [+]400 Eighteen-month buy-and-hold
Nomad is the broker returns
DD. Associations Between Nomad Characteristics and Company Survival
Nomad quality, defined as the [_]401 Market switching from Main
Nomad is the broker Market to AIM
EE. Associations Between Ownership and Book Performance
Venture capitalist backing [+]402 Sales Growth
FF. Associations Between Ownership and Company Characteristics
Institutional ownership + +403 Assets
percentage
Institutional ownership Board quality, defined as
percentage _404 percent of directors holding
shares
Institutional ownership Board quality, defined as
percentage [+]405 percent of nonexecutive
directors




400 Gerakos et al., Post-listing Performance, supra note 17, at 210 tbl. 10.
401 MALLIN & OW-YONG, supra note 41, at 89 tbl.5.5; Mallin & Ow-Yong, supra
note 45, at 527 tbl.6.
402 Colombelli, supra note 26, at 21 tbl.3 & 22 tbl.4.
403 MALLIN & OW-YONG, supra note 41, at 89 tbl.5.5; Mallin & Ow-Yong, supra
note 45, at 527 tbl.6.
"4 Mallin & Ow-Yong, supra note 45, at 527 tbl.6.
405 Id.
406 Id.; MALLIN & OW-YONG, supra note 41, at 89 tbl.5.5.
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Managerial ownership percent -- 408  Assets
Managerial ownership percent Board quality, defined as
- -409 percent of nonexecutive
directors
Managerial ownership percent [+]410 Board quality, defined as size
Managerial ownership percent Disclosure of corporate
[_]411 governance standards
I compliance
GG. Associations Between Ownership and Market Performance
Retail investor ownership _ 412 Twelve-month buy-and-hold
percentage returns
Retail investor ownership 413 Eighteen-month buy-and-hold
percentage returns
Retail investor ownership 414 Twenty-four-month buy-and-
percentage hold returns
HH. Associations Between Ownership and Company Survival
Institutional ownership [_]415 Market switching from Main
percentage Market to AIM
Managerial ownership percent [+]416 Market switching from Main
Market to AIM
Venture capitalist backing [+]417 Delisting
Venture capitalist backing [+]418 Survival time
407 MALLIN & OW-YONG, supra note 41, at 90 tbl.5.6; Mallin & Ow-Yong, supra
note 45, at 527 tbl.7.
408 Mallin & Ow-Yong, supra note 45, at 527 tbl.6.
409 Id.
410Id.
411 Id. at 527 tbl.7.
412 Gerakos et al., Post-listing Performance, supra note 17, at 211 tbl. 11.
413 Id.
414 Id.
415 MALLIN & OW-YONG, supra note 41, at 89 tbl.5.5; Mallin & Ow-Yong, supra
note 45, at 527 tbl.6.
416 Mallin & Ow-Yong, supra note 45, at 527 tbl.6.
417 Espenlaub et al., supra note 28, at 30 tbl.9 & 31 tbl. 10.
4 18 Id.

